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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK
ABOUT VOTING: EFFICIENCY AND THE ERROR
IN EMPTY VOTING
By Patricia Beck*
Abstract
Under the shareholder primacy model, shareholders exercise voting
power because their votes are wealth maximizing and efficient. The
practice of decoupling, or the strategic separation of the right to vote
on a share from the economic ownership of that share, undermines
this efficiency. The decoupled investor’s interests are not aligned
with maximizing the value of the corporation and decoupled
investors have, to the detriment of all other shareholders, used their
voting power to dictate inefficient corporate decisions. This Note
advocates for proxy card disclosure of decoupled shares and
subsequent voiding of the decoupled votes. In this way, only those
shares interested in wealth maximization are able to influence
corporate outcome, restoring efficiency to shareholder voting.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 212
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AS AN EFFICIENT MEANS OF WEALTH
MAXIMIZATION ............................................................................ 214
A. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY .......................................................... 214
B. DECOUPLING OF VOTING RIGHTS FROM ECONOMIC
OWNERSHIP ............................................................................. 216
II. FAILURE OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES TO CAPTURE
DECOUPLING, AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS.................................. 222
A. THE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REGIME ......................................... 222
B. CURRENT PROPOSALS ............................................................... 224
1. Expansion of Disclosure Rules to Capture Decoupling..... 224
2. Bylaw Amendments ............................................................ 226

* J.D. Candidate 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 2010 English &
American Literature, New York University. I would like to thank Professor Gentile for
her guidance and support in writing this Note.

211

212

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: RESTORING EFFICIENCY THROUGH
PROXY CARD DISCLOSURE AND EXCLUSION OF DECOUPLED
VOTES........................................................................................... 228
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 230
INTRODUCTION
In early 2001, Perry Corporation (“Perry”), a hedge fund, was a
substantial shareholder of Rubicon Ltd. (“Rubicon”).1 By June 2001,
however, Perry publically announced that it had whittled down its
sizeable investment to that below the threshold requiring disclosure.2
Surprisingly, a year later, Perry disclosed a sizeable holding in Rubicon
conveniently in time to vote at Rubicon’s annual meeting.3
Unbeknownst to Rubicon, Perry had previously engaged in derivatives
transactions designed to decouple the economic interest of their shares
from the attendant voting rights.4 Decoupled of its voting rights, Perry’s
holding diminished in size albeit temporarily. Then, before the annual
meeting, Perry easily unwound its derivative transactions, reuniting the
shares with their voting rights and consolidating its once again sizeable
holding in time to influence the vote.5 In short, Perry had engaged in
“decoupling,” or the strategic separation of the right to vote from the
economic ownership of shares.6
Decoupling has existed undocumented for an undetermined amount
of time.7 Yet, in 2005, Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy first identified
situations in which investors used derivatives to vary their economic
1. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 836 (2006) (discussing
the Perry-Rubicon situation).
2. Because Rubicon is a New Zealand company, it is required to disclose 5%
ownership positions pursuant to New Zealand law, similar to that of Section 13(d) in
the United States. See id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 836-37.
5. Id. at 827.
6. See, e.g., id. at 815-16.
7. Because decoupling is “largely unregulated and often unseen,” determining its
full extent and historical presence is difficult to measure. Id. at 818-19. Nevertheless,
Hu and Black have been able to identify eighty-two decoupling examples from 1988
through 2008. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and
Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 661-81 (2008).
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interests while retaining voting power, or engaged in decoupling
practices.8 Next, Henry Hu and Bernard Black comprehensively
discussed the phenomenon of decoupling in their seminal article, The
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership.9
Hu and Black referred to decoupling as the “new vote buying” because
it consists of a combination of “conventional” transactions that are by
themselves not suspect: the purchasing of shares and using derivatives
for hedging purposes.10 The results, however, are anything but
conventional.11
For the decoupled investor who maintains voting rights but who has
otherwise abrogated economic ownership, decoupling may have many
benefits, chief among them personal profit.12 Corporate law rewards an
interest in profit maximization so long as it is aligned with maximizing
firm value.13 Under the shareholder primacy model of corporate law,
shareholders are given the ability to vote on corporate decisions
precisely because they are more tied to the economic risk in the
venture.14 As the “residual claimants,” they are interested in maximizing
firm value more than any other corporate party.15 Shareholder votes are
thus deemed efficient because their decisions will be directed at wealth
maximization.16 The decoupled investor, on the other hand, has severed
herself from the economic interest of her shares and is therefore not
interested in maximizing the value of those shares.17 And despite her
disinterest in wealth maximization, the decoupled investor still retains
the right to vote on those shares—her votes are inefficient.18
8. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775,
789-94 (2005) (describing seven situations where shareholders use derivatives to
decouple their voting rights from economic interest).
9. Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 816.
10. See id. at 818.
11. See infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 44.
13. See infra note 23.
14. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A
Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996)
(“The case for the one share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match
economic incentives with voting power . . .”).
15. See infra note 26.
16. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 39.
18. See infra note 39.
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This Note argues that the votes associated with decoupled shares
should be excluded from corporate voting. To accomplish this, federal
disclosure rules should require that investors disclose the extent of their
shares that are decoupled in the event of a vote.19 Aware of the
decoupled votes, the corporation can therefore exclude those from the
final vote tally, curing the inefficiency problem by only counting those
votes that are interested in maximizing firm value.20
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the efficiency
rationale underlying the shareholder primacy model, and how
decoupling breaks the efficiency link in its various forms. Part II
discusses the existing disclosure requirements, how decoupling evades
those requirements, and critiques existing proposals to address
decoupling. Part III describes the author’s proposal to mandate the
disclosure of decoupled shares on shareholder voting proxy cards and to
exclude them from the vote.
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AS AN EFFICIENT MEANS OF WEALTH
MAXIMIZATION
This part begins by exploring the shareholder primacy model and
the crucial efficiency link between shareholders’ interest in wealth
maximization and their right to vote on corporate decisions. The
remainder of this part then discusses decoupling, its forms and
techniques, and how it breaks the efficiency link.
A. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Corporations exist to generate wealth.21 Maximization of firm value
in turn maximizes social welfare.22 Accordingly, corporate law achieves

19.
20.
21.

See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.”).
22. Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers, On
Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden
Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1120 (2013) [hereinafter Barry et al.] (arguing that
the “justification for giving shareholders control rights is that doing so maximizes the
value of the corporation, which in turn maximizes social welfare”); see also Black &
Kraakman, supra note 14, at 1945-46.
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this goal most efficiently by allocating voting rights to those who are
uniquely situated to pursue firm wealth maximization: the corporation’s
shareholders.23 This is referred to as the shareholder primacy model.24 A
long line of legal and economic scholarship supports and reinforces the
wisdom of shareholder primacy.25
Shareholder primacy is efficient because shareholders are more
invested, and therefore more interested, in wealth maximization than
any other corporate party.26 As both the true owners of the corporate
property27 and the “residual claimants” of the corporation, shareholders
reap the benefit or bear the brunt of the loss in firm value.28 They will
vote to their benefit by maximizing firm value.29 Yet, shareholders
exercise virtually no control over the corporation’s general business and
affairs, which are instead managed “by or under the direction of a board
of directors.”30 This “efficiency link,” giving voting power to the
corporate party who is most interested in maximizing firm value,
ensures that the business and affairs are wealth-maximizing.31 For
instance, major corporate transactions or “fundamental changes” (such
as liquidations, large asset sales, and mergers) that are most likely to
directly affect firm value are subject to approval by shareholder votes.32
Under the default rule, a shareholder is entitled to vote in
proportion to the size of her investment.33 Shareholders vote either in

23. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 66-72; see also Robert B.
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 136 (2009)
(discussing how “regulation of voting behavior also occurs to ensure the correct
alignment between voting and the common welfare”).
24. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 408 (2002).
25. Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1112; see also Black & Kraakman, supra note
14, at 1945-46; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983). While the shareholder primacy model is generally
accepted, it is not undisputed. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 441-42.
26. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 67-70.
27. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 408 (“[U]nder the traditional conception of
shareholder primacy, shareholders are said to own the corporation.”).
28. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 67-70.
29. See id.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141.
31. See supra note 23.
32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275(b), 271(a), 251(c).
33. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 450. Virtually all state corporate codes have
adopted this one-share-one-vote standard as the default rule. Id. at 453.
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person or by proxy, although most shareholders vote by proxy.34 A
proxy is a shareholder’s grant of authority to another to vote her
shares.35 Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
has broad authority to regulate the issuance of proxies.36
B. DECOUPLING OF VOTING RIGHTS FROM ECONOMIC OWNERSHIP
Decoupling refers to a variety of practices in which a shareholder
may separate, or decouple, the voting rights attached to the economic
ownership of her shares.37 Decoupling consists of two conventional
transactions: buying shares and hedging those shares.38 The combination
of those transactions results in breaking the efficiency link: those parties
with voting power are not affected by an increase in firm value and
therefore not interested in maximizing firm value.39 Although it may not
benefit the corporation, decoupling is attractive to an investor for a
number of reasons.40 Decoupling allows an investor to hedge her
investment and minimize her exposure to market changes.41 Decoupling
34.
35.

See, e.g., id. at 443.
ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS 292 (4th ed. 2006). A shareholder may also sell the voting rights attached to
her shares. Such “vote-buying” is permissible, but somewhat suspect as “easily
susceptible of abuse,” and is therefore subject to a test for “intrinsic fairness.” Schreiber
v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78n. Issuers with a class of securities registered under Section 12
of the Exchange Act are required to comply with federal rules governing the solicitation
of proxies. Id. Rules 14a-4 and 14a-5 deal with the formatting of the proxy cards (font
type, box to check for approval, disapproval, or abstention for each matter voted upon).
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-4, 5 (2014). In the case of fundamental changes, Rule 14a-3
requires disclosure of information mandated by Schedule 14 for specific transaction. 17
C.F.R § 240.14a-3 (2014). Broadly, Rule 14a-6 requires that the preliminary proxy
statement and ballot be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ten days
before the final copies are expected to be delivered to shareholders. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-6 (2014).
37. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 816.
38. See id. at 818.
39. See id. at 815 (arguing that negative economic ownership “gives the investor an
incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company’s share price”); see also Martin &
Partnoy, supra note 8, at 809-10 (referring to this situation as “voting arbitrage”).
40. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1120-29 (discussing the potential
problems and benefits of decoupling).
41. JEFFREY J. HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE 119 (2014).
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also enables an investor to strategically evade disclosing her investment
position.42 Unknown to her fellow shareholders, she is able to covertly
influence major corporate decisions.43 Finally, decoupling can yield
investors a large personal profit.44
The hedged position may be achieved through traditional securities
or derivative instruments such as forward, future, and swap contracts.45
A derivative is a security whose value depends on, or derives from, the
value of another asset or financial or economic variable.46 Through the
use of derivative instruments, it has become cheaper and easier for an
investor to engage in decoupling.47
Perhaps the most straightforward way to engage in decoupling is by
purchasing shares in the corporation while simultaneously hedging that
investment by “shorting” those shares.48 To short shares is to bet that the
value of those shares will decrease.49 For example, an investor may
purchase equity or equity derivatives that increase in value as the
corporation’s share price falls.50 Her economic interest is decoupled
from her right to vote because the hedge abrogates her investment in the
value of those shares and she is left only with the right to vote.51 In such
a situation, the efficiency link has been broken: the investor has the right
to vote but is not interested in maximizing firm value.52 On the contrary,

42.
43.
44.

See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1126.
See HAAS, supra note 41, at 119-20; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1121.
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Loophole Lets a Foot in the Door, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2008, at C1 (“So why do investors go to such extremes to mask their trading?
Money – lots of it.”).
45. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 816; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114-15.
46. See HAAS, supra note 41, at 119.
47. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815 (explaining how derivatives have made it
“cheaper and easier” to engage in decoupling).
48. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 484-85 (2008).
49. An investor who sells short borrows a security from a broker, sells it and buys
an identical security to give back to the broker. The short is profitable if the price of the
security drops after the investor sells it and before she buys another to give back to her
broker. See IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE 167 (2d ed. 2011).
50. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 48, at 484-85.
51. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 818 (describing how an investor buys shares
in the open market and uses derivatives to offset the economic ownership of those
shares, the investor “is left only with voting ownership”).
52. See supra note 39.

218

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

because she is betting that the firm value will decrease, she is interested
in decreasing firm value.53
Another way of decoupling involves futures and forward
contracts.54 Futures and forward contracts create an obligation under
which the purchaser is obligated to buy, and the seller is obligated to
sell, the underlying asset at a particular price (“forward price”) on a
particular date in the future (“expiration date”).55 In the period from
when the parties enter into the contract until the expiration date, the
seller has no real economic interest in the shares she is selling because
she neither benefits nor suffers from any change in their value.56
However, until the expiration date, she is still the legal owner of those
shares and retains the right to vote on them.57 If the seller enters into a
forward or futures contract in which she agrees to sell more shares than
she presently owns, in order to fulfill the contract she will need to
purchase the shares-promised-yet-not-yet-owned on the market.58 She
therefore desires that the market price of those shares she will purchase
to fulfill the contract be lower than the amount to be paid – she is
interested in decreasing firm value.59 Again, the efficiency link has been
broken because she retains the right to vote those shares while she is
incentivized to vote to decrease their value.60
Hu and Black characterize such an investor’s position in different
ways, depending on the degree of separation of the voting rights and
economic interest.61 “Hidden ownership” refers to situations in which an
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114-16.
See HAAS, supra note 41, at 131. Broadly speaking, the difference between
forward and futures contract is that forward contracts are privately-negotiated
agreements, while futures contracts are standardized and publicly-traded. Id. at 131,
133. Forward and futures contracts are designed to decrease the contracting parties’
exposure to price fluctuations of the underlying asset. Id. If the underlying asset is a
security, then the contract is a derivative instrument. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at
1113. However, should the asset’s spot price rise above the forward price, the contract
becomes valuable to the purchaser, who can sell the underlying asset for a profit
immediately after executing the contract. Id.
56. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1113-14.
57. See id. at 1114.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See supra note 39.
61. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815-16 (describing and classifying
decoupling’s different forms).
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investor’s economic interest exceeds her voting rights.62 Similarly,
“hidden (morphable) ownership” is a combination of hidden ownership
with acquired control of voting rights.63 “Empty voting,” perhaps the
most well known instance of decoupling, refers to situations in which an
investor’s voting rights exceed her economic interest.64 Extreme cases of
empty voting, in which an investor has voting rights despite having
negative economic interest in the corporation, are referred to as
“negative voting.”65 Negative voting is extreme not only because of its
negative ownership but also because the position gives the investor the
incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company’s share price.66
Though these types of ownership are dissimilar, they are alike in that
they all break the efficiency link between a shareholder’s interest in
wealth maximization and voting power.67 For example, if the hedged
position the investor used to short her shares completely offsets her
economic investment in the corporation, she will have become an empty
voter.68 Where the hedged position is strong enough, however, her
hedged position may outweigh her investment in the corporation and she
is a negative voter.69 In this situation, the negative voter is not interested
in maximizing firm value because it is more profitable for her to pursue
the interests of her hedged position.70

62.
63.

See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1115; Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 825.
See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815-16. An example of morphable ownership
is the following: A and B enter into a contract (a futures contract) in which B will buy
A’s shares for a particular price on a particular date and A informally agrees to vote the
share as B wishes until that date. Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1116.
64. The votes are “empty” because the shares have been “emptied” of the
economic risk normally inherent in those voting rights. See Hu & Black, supra note 1,
at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114; see also Martin & Partnoy, supra note 8, at
780 (referring to the situation as “encumbered shares” rather than empty voting).
65. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815.
66. Id. at 815. An example of negative ownership is the following: A and B enter
into a futures contract in which A agrees to sell to B more shares than she presently
owns. In order to fulfill the contract, B will have to purchase the shares promised-butnot-yet-owned. Therefore, B desires that the price at which she buys theses shares is
less than the price that she will be paid – she desires that the stock’s value decreases.
Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114 (“[T]he empty voter actively wants the corporation
to decrease in value.”).
67. See supra note 39.
68. See Black & Hu, supra note 1, at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114.
69. See Black & Hu, supra note 1, at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114.
70. See Black & Hu, supra note 1, at 815; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1114.
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Examples of such anti-wealth maximization behavior exist and are
well documented as cautionary market tales.71 Take, for example, the
story of Henderson Land.72 In 2006, Henderson Land offered to buy all
outstanding shares of its publicly-held affiliate, Henderson Investment,
for a substantial premium.73 Because Henderson Investment
shareholders were in favor of the buyout, Henderson Investment’s share
price increased substantially and the buyout seemed highly likely.74 Yet
to the market’s surprise, Henderson Investment’s shareholders rejected
Henderson Land’s offer.75 In response, Henderson Investment’s share
price dropped significantly after the vote was announced.76 Reports later
emerged that one or more hedge funds had borrowed enough Henderson
Investment shares to vote against the buyout.77 Confident that their votes
would block the transaction, the hedge fund (or funds) had bet that the
value of Henderson Investment’s shares would drop and shorted their
shares.78 Thus the hedge fund (or funds), for its personal benefit,
manipulated the vote to block a deal that would have benefited other
shareholders.79
Also consider the example of hedge fund Perry’s80 involvement in
Mylan Laboratories’ (“Mylan”) acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals
(“King”).81 In 2004, Mylan announced an agreement to acquire King,
but the merger was subject to approval of both companies’
shareholders.82 Perry owned seven million shares in King and stood to
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See, e.g., infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 834-35.
See id. at 834; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1105.
See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 834.
See id.; Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1106.
See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 834.
See id. at 834-35.
See id.
See id. at 835.
See id. at 842-43. It is worth noting that Perry is somewhat of a repeat-player
with decoupling. Perry was involved in both the Rubicon example, supra notes 1-6, and
the King-Mylan acquisition, infra notes 80-89. In addition, the hedge fund Children’s
Investment Fund, while headed by a Perry alumnus, was involved in Deutsche Boerse’s
attempted acquisition of the London Stock Exchange. Hu & Black, supra note 1, at
842-43.
81. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive
Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 46 (2006) (“[T]he Perry deal has become a rallying
cry for regulating hedge funds . . .”).
82. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 828.
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make a $28 million profit if the merger went through.83 Mylan
shareholders still had to approve the deal, however, and Mylan’s shares
had dropped sharply when the deal was announced.84 To ensure that
Mylan voted in favor of the merger, Perry acquired a 9.9% voting stake
in Mylan, but hedged its stake in Mylan through a series of equity swaps
and “other undisclosed transactions.”85 Thereby, Perry had acquired
voting power in Mylan to make sure Mylan voted the way it wanted, but
had emptied its stake in Mylan of economic interest.86 Absent any
economic interest in Mylan, Perry desired to complete the deal even if
Mylan’s firm value would suffer.87 Perry was voting against the wealthmaximizing interests of other Mylan shareholders.88 Carl Icahn, a large
Mylan shareholder who had opposed the acquisition, sued Perry for
voting without any true economic ownership and for having a negative
ownership.89
The Henderson Land and Perry examples differ in their decoupling
strategies but are similar examples of hedge funds surreptitiously
dictating the outcome of major transactions for their personal benefit to
the detriment of other shareholders.90 Or, as one commentator described
it, influencing the outcome of shareholder elections for one’s own
benefit at the expense of the corporation allowed hedge funds to
“‘hijack’ shareholder elections for their own private gain.”91

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 48, at 485.
Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 828-29.
Id.
Id. The lawsuit was well publicized. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Icahn Cries Foul
at Perry’s No-Risk Play in Takeover Fight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2004, at C1; Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Icahn Accuses a Hedge Fund of Stock Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2004, at C1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Nothing Ventured, Everything Gained, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2004, at C1. But the lawsuit became moot when Mylan called off the
acquisition. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 829.
90. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 835.
91. Jonathan Katz, Note, Barbarians at the Ballot Box: The Use of Hedging to
Acquire Low Cost Corporate Influence and Its Effect on Shareholder Apathy, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1483, 1516 (2006).
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II. FAILURE OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES TO CAPTURE
DECOUPLING, AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
This part begins by describing the existing federal disclosure
regime and how decoupling allows an investor to strategically evade
disclosure obligations. It then considers existing proposals for reform—
enhanced federal disclosure rules and bylaw amendments aimed at
capturing decoupling—but finds that they fail to remedy decoupling’s
inefficiency problem.
A. THE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REGIME
Disclosure rules are the “cornerstone” of modern securities
regulation.92 The disclosure regime is built on the strong belief that
transparency leads to greater market efficiency.93 The purpose of
federally mandated disclosure is to “alert the marketplace” of other
investors who may be able to exert control over corporate decisions.94
When called upon to disclose information, an investor is largely
required to reveal her investment portfolio.95 A disclosure-based regime
therefore enables more informed decisions and improves market

92. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1153; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory
Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2000) (“Mandatory
disclosure is a – if not the – defining characteristic of U.S. securities regulation.”). This
is not to suggest that mandatory disclosure is not without its critics. See, e.g., Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 2359, 2372-88 (1998) (arguing for the removal of mandatory disclosure
requirements).
93. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1156 (arguing that increased
transparency of derivatives and financial markets generally could improve market
outcomes).
94. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]he
purpose of section 13(d) is to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or
accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might represent a
shift in corporate control . . . .”).
95. Under Schedule 13D, a shareholder is required to disclose her identity and
background (including any criminal convictions), the source of funds of her holding,
and any plans or proposals she has for the company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2014);
see also, Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1154 (describing how federally mandated
disclosure rules largely reveal the portfolios of “major market participants” and other
participants are then “able to discern what each other’s ownership and control rights
are”).
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outcomes.96 Generally, disclosure is not mandatory until the size of an
investor’s holding meets a threshold amount.97 The size of an investor’s
holding is based on her “beneficial ownership” of shares.98
However, beneficial ownership is determined in relation to voting
interest, not economic interest, and does not include informal voting
power such as hidden (morphable) ownership.99 Consequently,
decoupling, especially those relying on derivatives, often remains
untouched by federal disclosure rules.100 Despite the attempt to include
contracts or other arrangements contributing to the size of a
shareholder’s position within the definition of beneficial ownership, the
use of derivatives in structuring a holding often places that holding
outside the scope of the disclosure rules.101 Short positions, for instance,
whether they are in shares or derivatives, do not trigger disclosure under
Schedule 13D.102 Similarly, the use of swaps likely does not trigger
disclosure under either 13D or 13G.103 Therefore, an investor who holds
just under the 5% threshold as well as equity swaps conveying an
additional 11% economic ownership, putting her actual holdings above
96.
97.
98.

See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1156-59.
See infra note 98.
See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 866-67. Such beneficial ownership is subject
to mandatory disclosure in the following ways: institutional investors must disclose
their positions in public companies on Form 13F, SEC Form 13F, Information Required
of Institutional Investment Managers Pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Rules Thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 [hereinafter
Form 13F]; shareholders must disclose if they hold a position of 5% or more under
Schedule 13D if active shareholders, Schedule 13D, § 240.13d-101 [hereinafter 13D],
and under Schedule 13G if passive, Schedule 13G, § 240.13d-102 [hereinafter 13G];
insiders and shareholders with a 10% or larger position must disclose under section 16
of the Exchange Act (“Section 16”), Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. 78p (2012).
99. It does, however, cover sole or shared voting or investment power acquired
directly or indirectly through a contract or less formal arrangement. See Exchange Act
Rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3.
100. Disclosure obligations were “not crafted with derivatives in mind.” Barry et al.,
supra note 22, at 1154.
101. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 864-65. Share-lending may trigger disclosure
under 13D, but not under 13G. See id. at 868. Record date capture, by itself, is unlikely
to trigger disclosure under Schedule 13G. See id. at 868. Disclosure is more likely
under Section 16. See, e.g., id. at 872. Equity swaps and equity derivatives must be
disclosed and therefore shares hedged with derivatives would be disclosed. See, e.g., id.
at 873-74.
102. See id. at 867.
103. See id. at 868; see also supra note 98 (discussing 13D and 13G).
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the disclosure threshold, will not be subject to the disclosure
requirements.104 Indeed, such hidden (morphable) ownership is often
employed to shield ownership from public view.105
Given the Henderson Land and Perry examples, it is clear that
investors employ decoupling practices to strategically structure their
holdings to circumvent disclosure obligations that would otherwise be
applicable to holdings of that size.106 Investors’ reliance on the use of
derivatives has only made decoupling cheaper and easier.107 In addition,
because decoupling evades disclosure obligations, it has historically
been “largely unregulated and unseen.”108 Thus, decoupling also detracts
from the efficiency benefits of a transparent market.109
B. CURRENT PROPOSALS
1. Expansion of Disclosure Rules to Capture Decoupling
Hu and Black advocate for enhanced federally-mandated disclosure
as a remedy for decoupling.110 They propose an “integrated ownership
disclosure” solution that they feel both simplifies and builds upon the
existing regulatory structure.111 In addressing the use of derivatives, their
proposal consists largely of including direct and synthetic holdings
within economic ownership of shares, and extending Section 16

104.
105.
106.

See Hu & Black, supra note 1 at 868.
See, e.g., id. at 872.
Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1121 (“Decoupling makes it easier for an investor
to structure her holdings in a way that circumvents regulation . . . exploit any gaps in
the regulatory net.”); see also supra notes 1-6, 69-86 and accompanying text.
107. See Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815.
108. Id. at 818.
109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Thomas C. Pearson &
Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and Integrity:
Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1 (Fall
2007) (arguing that empty voting is one area, of many, in which regulation can help
achieve greater transparency and deter inappropriate practices). Even more troubling is
the fact that decoupling is associated with hedge funds and extremely wealthy investors
and insiders, suggesting that generally applicable disclosure costs are only borne by
those who cannot afford to buy out of them. See Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1121-22;
Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 815.
110. Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 864. At the same time, Hu and Black
acknowledge that a more substantive response may be needed. Id.
111. See id. at 876.
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disclosures to reach shareholders with derivative positions who would
report on Form 13F and Schedules 13D and 13G.112 The extent of the
information disclosed would be assessed against a sort of “ordinary
derivatives dealer” standard, or enough that a dealer with access to
information on the volatility and “other pricing parameters” could assess
the derivative’s value.113 Hu and Black would also require disclosure of
share lending and borrowing practices, even if those practices are
unaccompanied by economic ownership.114
Respectfully, while Hu and Black’s proposal would be more
effective at capturing decoupling than the current system, it does not
adequately deal with the fundamental flaw in allowing decoupled
investors to vote and impact the outcome of major corporate decisions.
115
In other words, the efficiency link is still missing.116 Even if federal
disclosure rules were expanded to encompass decoupled holdings,
investors who are not interested in wealth maximization would still be
able to vote.117 Disclosure will not solve inefficient voting practices.118
In addition, Hu and Black’s proposal of enhanced disclosure obligations
increases transaction costs.119 Given that individual shareholders already
face significant transaction costs in acquiring and processing
information, further costly disclosure requirements will reduce
efficiency by discouraging investors from evaluating the available
information.120
Nevertheless, a disclosure-based solution such as Hu and Black’s is
attractive for many reasons. One reason is that it furthers the
longstanding commitment to transparency as the means to a fair and
efficient market.121 Other commentators have shown support for Hu and
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 878.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 878.
See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Katz, supra note 91, at 1516-17 (rejecting enhanced disclosure as a
solution for decoupling because “the rational response of shareholders that learn the
intricacies of hedge fund involvement in their corporate elections [is] abstention from
voting”). Even Hu and Black, in advocating for their “integrated ownership disclosure”
proposal, acknowledge that enhanced ownership disclosure must be “crafted with
sensitivity to the costs of disclosure.” Hu & Black, supra note 1, at 819.
120. Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1158.
121. See supra note 93.
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Black’s “integrated ownership disclosure” proposal in advocating for
similar solutions.122 Ultimately, because decoupling is naturally
“unseen,” any solution will require some form of disclosure.123 Indeed,
disclosure would allow observers to identify the existence and frequency
of decoupling.124 Otherwise, it will continue to exist below the radar,
undetected and untouchable.125
2. Bylaw Amendments
In the absence of a satisfactory regulatory response, corporations
are taking measures to protect themselves and their shareholders from
empty and negative voters.126 Some scholars have proposed that
corporations force disclosure of synthetic positions as a requirement for
eligibility to nominate directors.127 For instance, in 2008, Sara Lee
amended its bylaws to require a shareholder who nominates a board
member or submits a proposal that could alter the path of the business to
disclose if the shareholder has “hedged its ownership” or has “any short
position in the stock.”128 Similarly, Coach amended its bylaws to require
any shareholder’s “hedging activities” to be divulged upon submitting a
proposal.129 This solution attempts to address empty voting by counting
122. See, e.g., Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund
Regulation: Current Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. &
EMP. L. 833 (2008) (arguing that the SEC can regulate by enforcing disclosure of voting
and economic stakes in the form of 13D filings); Sean M. Donahue, Lessons Learned
from CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management and Proposals for Reform,
4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 221 (2010) (arguing that the SEC should amend Rule
13d-3(a) to require disclosure of parties’ holdings in equity swaps and sterilization of
votes in 13(d) context).
123. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 22, at 1156.
125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership
from Control, 33 SEATTLE L. U. REV. 931, 943-44 (2010).
127. See, e.g., Elina Khasina, Note, Disclosure of “Beneficial Ownership” of
Synthetic Positions in Takeover Campaigns, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 904, 905-06
(2009); Charles M. Nathan, Developments in Takeover Defenses, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 23, 2008), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2008/
10/23/developments-in-takeover-defenses/ [http://perma.cc/NP6P-DDA7].
128. Matt Andrejczak, Sara Lee, Coach Set Rules to Spot Shareholder Actions,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 2, 2008, 6:30 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sara-leecoach-set-rules-to-deter-devious-shareholders [http://perma.cc/6ZE2-JFNK].
129. Id.
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shares referenced in any sort of derivative transaction, rather than just
shares actually owned, towards beneficial ownership.130
These bylaw amendments have the benefit of being less costly than
Hu & Black’s “integrated ownership disclosure” proposal because the
expense of gathering the required information and disclosing it to the
corporation is lower.131 Unlike the obligations under federal disclosure
rules, the information would not need to be disclosed periodically.132
The investor would not need to continuously monitor her beneficial
ownership and promptly disclose any updates on any changes in the size
of her holding.133 Rather, a Coach or Sara Lee investor would only need
to discern and disclose the number of shares hedged on a single, relevant
date.134
However, decoupling is only disclosed if management chooses to
amend the corporation’s bylaws.135 Protection from decoupling would
therefore vary from corporation to corporation.136 Moreover, disclosure
of synthetic positions does not directly prevent a decoupled investor
from using her votes to covertly thwart a wealth-maximizing
transaction.137 The bylaw amendment solution is reactionary rather than
prophylactic; it does not prevent the inefficient voting from happening
but only renders those guilty voters more identifiable for blame.138
Ultimately, the bylaw amendments suffer from the same shortcoming as
130. See William B. Chandler III, Symposium, The Delaware Court of Chancery:
An Insider’s View of Change and Continuity, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 411, 415
(referring to these bylaw amendments as a “new wave” of pills).
131. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
132. Upon reaching the threshold amount of shares beneficially owned. See, e.g.,
supra note 98.
133. A shareholder who is unprepared to disclose proprietary information, especially
one with a holding just under the threshold amount, needs to monitor the extent of her
beneficial ownership to ensure that it does not inadvertently rise above the threshold
amount. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. Should the shareholder discover
that she has risen above the threshold amount and triggered disclosure obligations, she
must disclose promptly. For instance, under Schedule 13D, a shareholder has ten days.
17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1(a) (2014).
134. As opposed to the substantive proprietary information required under federal
disclosure obligations. See, e.g., supra note 95.
135. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
136. Protection from decoupling may also depend on legal counsel. See supra note
127.
137. See, e.g., supra note 91.
138. Eliminating the “unseen” nature problem. See supra note 108. But the
inefficiency problem still remains. See supra note 39.
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Hu & Black’s enhanced disclosure solution: neither remedies the
inefficiency problem in allowing decoupled investors, who are not
interested in wealth maximization, to vote.139
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: RESTORING EFFICIENCY THROUGH
PROXY CARD DISCLOSURE AND EXCLUSION OF DECOUPLED VOTES
Shareholders are empowered with the right to vote because their
unique interest in corporate wealth maximization makes their votes
efficient.140 Absent that interest, it is no longer efficient to give
shareholders the right to vote.141 Any proposal should bear directly on
this inefficiency problem. Accordingly, pursuant to its authority under
Section 14 of the Exchange Act, the SEC should mandate that
shareholders disclose on proxy cards, under penalty of voiding their
votes, the amount of shares for which they are entitled to vote that are
hedged or decoupled on the day of the vote.142 Those decoupled votes
would then be excluded from the vote.143 This proxy card disclosure
proposal directly cures the inefficiency problem by only allowing those
votes that are tied to wealth maximizing shares to influence corporate
outcome.144 Those shares that are not wealth maximizing, such as those
that are shorted, would thus not be able to dictate corporate outcome.145
This proposal not only restores the efficiency link of shareholder
voting and wealth maximization, but also imposes minimal costs.146 The
139.
140.
141.

See supra note 39.
See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
This Note emphasizes that the hedging behavior associated with decoupling is
not by itself inefficient. Rather, only when that behavior is contemporaneous with a
vote, has the behavior rendered the voting inefficient. See supra note 39.
142. Under Section 14, the SEC has broad authority to issue rules governing the
issuance of proxy cards. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The proxy card
disclosure proposed here is similar to that enforced by the Sarah Lee and Coach bylaw
amendments, but is expanded beyond director nomination and shareholder proposals to
include all opportunities subject to shareholder approval, including major corporate
transactions. See supra notes 127-29.
143. Thus excluding those inefficient votes. See supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
144. Id.
145. Thus preventing the “hijacking” problem of corporate actions for inefficient
purposes. See supra note 91.
146. See infra note 150. It is certainly less costly than federally mandated disclosure.
See, e.g., supra notes 133-34.
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proxy card disclosure is different from the disclosure currently
mandated under federal disclosure rules.147 Where the latter is designed
to alert the marketplace of voting power, this proposal is designed to
alert the shareholders of the corporation to those other shareholders
whose voting interests are compromised.148 As such, the proxy card
disclosure is much more limited in scope, commands less effort, and
demands less sensitive information from the investor.149 Where federal
disclosure rules reveal proprietary information across an investor’s
entire investment portfolio, this proposal only mandates disclosure of a
fixed number of shares on a specific date.150 Thus, the information
disclosed is neither proprietary nor cumbersome.151
Moreover, the costs of obtaining this information are relatively low
in comparison to federal disclosure rules that require monitoring and
updating disclosure as the investor’s positions change.152 In contrast to
federal disclosure obligations, which apply at all times, this proposal’s
obligations are triggered only in the event of a shareholder vote.153 In
this way, this proposal burdens decoupled shareholders with disclosure
obligations only when it is necessary.154
The idea of excluding some shareholders’ votes may seem radical.
However, such behavior is not novel in corporate law.155 Indeed,
147.
148.
149.

See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
The proposed proxy card disclosure does not incur the monitoring costs
inherent in federally mandated disclosure rules. See infra note 152 and accompanying
text. Nor does this proposal call upon an investor to bear the costs of revealing sensitive
and proprietary information. See, e.g., supra note 95.
150. See, e.g., supra note 95. The information disclosed of would only be the
number of hedged or decoupled shared owned on the date of the vote. Similar to the
bylaw amendments, because this number is fixed and static, it does not require constant
updating. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 95.
152. Information disclosed under federal securities laws needs to be updated. For
example, an investor who beneficially owns more than 5% of a corporation needs to
disclose certain information under 13D after meeting that 5% threshold. See supra notes
95, 98. Such an investor must also “promptly” file amendments to his 13D disclosures
is if there is any material change in the facts disclosed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (2014).
153. And therefore do not require updating. See supra note 152; see also supra notes
132-33 and accompanying text.
154. Disclosure obligations would be limited to events such as fundamental changes
or major corporate transactions in which shareholders have a heightened interest in
wealth maximization. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., supra note 35 (discussing vote-buying).
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Delaware courts are willing to exclude votes in similar situations in
which they are concerned about shareholder abuse of the voting
franchise.156 Furthermore, excluding the compromised votes of
decoupled investors would not take anything away from that class of
shareholders.157 Rather, viewed according to the shareholder primacy
model, these empty or negative shareholders have not earned the right to
vote because they do not possess the requisite interest in wealth
maximization that forms the basis of efficient corporate voting.158
CONCLUSION
Decoupled voting is inefficient. Corporate law should promote
efficiency in the corporate form above all else. Shareholder voting rights
are justified because when shareholders vote for decisions that are
wealth maximizing, they are voting efficiently. The decoupled investor
is not interested in maximizing firm value. In contrast, she acts to the
detriment of the corporation and her fellow shareholders.
Enhanced disclosure through SEC rules or amendments to a
corporation’s bylaws may render decoupling less clandestine and
underhanded. Indeed, either solution may make decoupling a less
attractive strategy to some. Still, neither solution is able to cure the
inefficiency problem inherent in allowing decoupled investors to vote on
corporate decisions. By allowing only those wealth-maximizing votes to
participate in deciding the corporation’s future, efficiency is restored to
the corporate form.

156. “Similar situations” referring to fundamental changes or major corporate
transactions where the return of the shareholders’ investment is most critical. See id.
157. Because they have “earned” the right to vote according to the underlying
efficiency rationale of the shareholder primacy model; they do not possess the
“efficiency link” empowering shareholders with the right to vote. See supra notes 24-31
and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 39.

